<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?>
<rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom">
  <channel>
    <title>Khalifa Haftar on k4i.com</title>
    <link>https://k4i.com/tags/khalifa-haftar/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Khalifa Haftar on k4i.com</description>
    <generator>Hugo</generator>
    <language>en-us</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <atom:link href="https://k4i.com/tags/khalifa-haftar/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
    <item>
      <title>Libya as Russia&#39;s Strategic Logistics Hub in Africa</title>
      <link>https://k4i.com/libya-as-russias-strategic-logistics-hub-in-africa/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://k4i.com/libya-as-russias-strategic-logistics-hub-in-africa/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Libya has never fit the Africa Corps model quite as cleanly as CAR or Mali. Russia&amp;rsquo;s engagement there is not primarily about counterinsurgency support to a fragile government — it is about projecting power into the Mediterranean and maintaining a logistics corridor that serves Russia&amp;rsquo;s broader African operations. Libya is less a client state than a strategic platform.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Wagner personnel reportedly began supporting Khalifa Haftar&amp;rsquo;s Libyan National Army around 2018, as Haftar positioned himself as a rival to the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. U.S. Africa Command assessed Wagner&amp;rsquo;s presence at roughly 2,000 personnel as of 2020, describing their role as vital to the LNA&amp;rsquo;s 2019–2020 campaign to seize Tripoli — a campaign that ultimately failed. Those numbers declined in 2022 as some operators were pulled toward Ukraine, and current figures remain uncertain.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
