Russia’s expanding security footprint in Africa poses a set of policy questions for the United States that do not resolve easily — and for which the current administration has offered no comprehensive answer. The Trump Administration’s 2025 National Security Strategy articulates a goal of reestablishing strategic stability with Russia but does not specify any approach to Russian operations on the African continent. That silence is itself a policy choice, and Congress is beginning to probe what it means.

Libya has never fit the Africa Corps model quite as cleanly as CAR or Mali. Russia’s engagement there is not primarily about counterinsurgency support to a fragile government — it is about projecting power into the Mediterranean and maintaining a logistics corridor that serves Russia’s broader African operations. Libya is less a client state than a strategic platform.

Wagner personnel reportedly began supporting Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army around 2018, as Haftar positioned himself as a rival to the internationally recognized government in Tripoli. U.S. Africa Command assessed Wagner’s presence at roughly 2,000 personnel as of 2020, describing their role as vital to the LNA’s 2019–2020 campaign to seize Tripoli — a campaign that ultimately failed. Those numbers declined in 2022 as some operators were pulled toward Ukraine, and current figures remain uncertain.

The Central African Republic is where Russia’s Africa playbook was first fully field-tested, and it remains one of the clearest illustrations of how the model works in practice. Russian personnel first arrived in late 2017 — about 175 “instructors,” including Wagner operators — after Russia secured a UN arms embargo exemption to supply weapons to the Touadera government. What began as an advisory mission expanded rapidly into something far more integrated.

Over the past decade, thousands of Russian security personnel have deployed across Africa under an arrangement that analysts have taken to calling a “military-business model” — security support exchanged for payment or access to natural resources. What began as a nominally private enterprise has since been folded into the Russian state apparatus, rebranded, and extended to new theaters. The operation is larger, more institutionalized, and more geopolitically consequential than its mercenary origins might suggest.

Sudan’s relationship with Russia has always been defined more by resource extraction and opportunistic arms dealing than by the kind of structured security partnership Moscow built in CAR or Mali. It is also the case that has most clearly illustrated the sanctions-evasion function of Russia’s African operations — and the extent to which the continent’s conflicts have become arenas for Russian commercial interests dressed up as strategic engagement.

The foundation was laid in 2017, when then-President Omar al-Bashir struck a series of deals with Moscow that opened Sudan to Wagner-linked commercial activity. Those firms moved into gold mining, working alongside elements of Sudan’s security forces in arrangements that were profitable for both sides and opaque to outside scrutiny. In 2022, Wagner was implicated in a scheme that involved smuggling Sudanese gold to Russia — providing hard currency at a moment when Western sanctions were beginning to bite.