Sudan: Russia's Gold, Guns, and Unfinished Base
Sudan’s relationship with Russia has always been defined more by resource extraction and opportunistic arms dealing than by the kind of structured security partnership Moscow built in CAR or Mali. It is also the case that has most clearly illustrated the sanctions-evasion function of Russia’s African operations — and the extent to which the continent’s conflicts have become arenas for Russian commercial interests dressed up as strategic engagement.
The foundation was laid in 2017, when then-President Omar al-Bashir struck a series of deals with Moscow that opened Sudan to Wagner-linked commercial activity. Those firms moved into gold mining, working alongside elements of Sudan’s security forces in arrangements that were profitable for both sides and opaque to outside scrutiny. In 2022, Wagner was implicated in a scheme that involved smuggling Sudanese gold to Russia — providing hard currency at a moment when Western sanctions were beginning to bite.
When war broke out in 2023 between Sudan’s rival military factions — the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces — Russia found itself in the uncomfortable position of having interests on both sides. The U.S. Treasury Department reported that Wagner had supplied the RSF with surface-to-air missiles during the conflict. Russia subsequently shifted toward supporting the military government, reportedly as part of a negotiation over basing rights on Sudan’s Red Sea coast — a location of considerable strategic value for Russian naval operations and as an alternative to Libyan or Syrian access points.
That naval base has not materialized, at least not yet. In late 2025, Russia’s ambassador to Sudan acknowledged that the base plan was on hold. The war has made Sudan difficult to operate in, the military government’s position remains precarious, and the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in the country has attracted a level of international scrutiny that complicates quiet basing negotiations.
Sudan nonetheless illustrates a consistent pattern: Russia identifies states with weak institutions, resource wealth, and security vulnerabilities, inserts commercial and paramilitary networks, and uses the resulting leverage to pursue longer-term strategic goals. In Sudan’s case, those goals include naval access, sanctions evasion, and a hedge against the loss of other Red Sea and Indian Ocean access points. The base may be on hold, but the underlying Russian interest in Sudan’s coast has not gone away.