Below you will find pages that utilize the taxonomy term “Federal Procurement”
NUBURU, AEVEX and XTEND Show Where Counter-Drone and Electronic Warfare Money Is Moving
Three filings on November 11 2026 came from three very different defense companies. Put side by side, they map the same shift. Buyers want portable, cheap ways to blind, jam or outnumber drones, and they want them fast. The big interceptor programs still exist. The new money is going to kits, jammers and small unmanned systems that a unit can carry.
The most specific of the three is also the smallest. NUBURU (NYSE American: BURU) says Tekne S.p.A., the Italian electronic warfare and special-vehicle maker it now owns 70% of, has entered two US Army prize competitions and is reviewing a NATO tender. NUBURU closed the Tekne purchase on October 15 2026 after Italy’s Golden Power review. Tekne builds the Tactical Bubble and J4 electronic warfare systems, both transportable or vehicle-mounted.
CRS Report on Removing PRC Artificial Intelligence Models from Federal Agencies
On October 20, 2026, the Department of Homeland Security ordered every federal civilian agency to stop buying products from Hangzhou DeepSeek Artificial Intelligence Basic Technology Research Co., Ltd. and to pull any DeepSeek product already running on its networks. The Department of Defense had done the same for its own systems on September 8, 2026, under a designation tied to Executive Order 14347, and the Director of National Intelligence issued a matching order for the intelligence community. A new Congressional Research Service brief sets out what the three orders do and why they came now.
Palantir's Civil Liberties Crisis
Palantir employees are openly questioning their company’s commitments to civil liberties as the Trump administration’s second term deepens relationships with ICE and the Department of Defense. Internal Slack logs and staff interviews, reported by Ars Technica, reveal a company caught between its foundational mission statements and the lucrative contract work that defines its business model.
The debate centers on a fundamental contradiction: Palantir built itself on data analytics for government agencies, but the Trump administration has weaponized those capabilities in ways that presume guilt and prioritize surveillance over due process. Employees invoking the company’s manifesto—ostensibly concerned with ethical governance—are bumping against a reality that the manifesto was always aspirational performance. Government contractors do not reject lucrative work on principle. They negotiate margins and liability.
Buy, Build, or Let the Vendor Decide: How Federal Agencies Are Approaching AI Acquisition
One of the more useful contributions of GAO’s April 2026 AI acquisitions report (GAO-26-107859) is its taxonomy of the different procurement approaches federal agencies are actually using—not as a policy prescription, but as an empirical account of what agencies have tried, what trade-offs they’ve encountered, and where each approach leaves agencies exposed.
Agency-Directed vs. Vendor-Driven
Some agencies began with a defined requirement and went out to acquire a solution. Others found vendors presenting AI capabilities to them that didn’t correspond to any existing requirement—and accepting those offerings anyway. GSA acquired a facility management software platform that included a chatbot feature the vendor added as a bonus, not in response to any stated requirement. VA awarded a task order for medical software that arrived with embedded AI capabilities.
Federal Agencies Are Buying AI Fast—and Making Expensive Mistakes
A new report from the Government Accountability Office arrives at a moment when federal AI spending is accelerating faster than the institutional frameworks meant to govern it. Released April 13, 2026, GAO-26-107859 examines how four major agencies—the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, the General Services Administration, and the Department of Veterans Affairs—have been acquiring AI capabilities, and finds a consistent pattern: agencies are learning hard lessons in isolation, then failing to share what they’ve learned.
Maven and USAi: What Mature Federal AI Acquisition Actually Looks Like
Most of GAO’s April 2026 report on federal AI acquisitions (GAO-26-107859) documents failure modes—programs that didn’t document lessons learned, contracts that lacked AI-specific terms, programs retired without institutional postmortems. Two acquisitions stand apart as comparative benchmarks: DOD’s Maven program and GSA’s USAi platform. The report uses them to illustrate what AI acquisition looks like when agencies have had time to learn from their own mistakes.
Maven
Project Maven is DOD’s longest-running high-profile AI acquisition. Managed by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, it uses machine learning and computer vision to analyze geospatial imagery and identify potential targets for human assessment. It has had a complicated history—including a period of public controversy over its AI ethics implications—but from an acquisition standpoint it represents an accumulation of hard-won institutional knowledge.
Six Ways Federal Agencies Keep Getting AI Procurement Wrong
The GAO’s April 2026 report on federal AI acquisitions (GAO-26-107859) is valuable not just for its top-line findings but for the taxonomy it provides of where government AI procurement consistently breaks down. Based on interviews with officials at DOD, DHS, GSA, VA, and the Department of Commerce, the report identifies six challenge areas—three strategic and three programmatic—that recurred across agencies regardless of the specific AI capability being acquired.
Access to Subject Matter Experts
The Federal Government's AI Amnesia Problem
There is a specific and fixable failure running through federal AI procurement that GAO’s April 2026 report (GAO-26-107859) surfaces with unusual clarity: agencies are accumulating experience with AI acquisitions and then letting that experience evaporate.
The pattern shows up in concrete cases. VA’s SoKAT program—a natural language processing tool built to scan veterans’ survey responses for indicators of suicidal ideation—was retired in January 2023 after officials concluded it didn’t improve enough over existing solutions to justify the cost. No lessons were documented. VA has multiple other AI programs targeting suicide prevention among veterans. Those programs could have benefited from what SoKAT’s team learned. They didn’t, because it was never written down.
Dark Eagle's Price Tag and the Congressional Oversight Problem
At roughly $41 million per missile in 2023 dollars — and reportedly higher for the first eight missiles requested in the FY2025 budget — the Dark Eagle sits at a price point that makes magazine depth a genuine strategic liability. A single battery holds eight rounds. The arithmetic is uncomfortable.
The Congressional Budget Office’s January 2023 study on U.S. hypersonic weapons placed the per-unit cost of intermediate-range boost-glide missiles comparable to the LRHW at that $41 million figure for a 300-missile buy. Army program officials confirmed in discussions with the Congressional Research Service that the actual fly-away cost for the initial FY2025 procurement would exceed that estimate. The standard procurement logic applies — costs should fall as production quantities rise — but the Army has not yet demonstrated that production scale is achievable at the pace operational demand would require.